1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 8 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 9 10 11 12 Matias Velazquez, 13 Movant, No. CV-11-820-PHX-RCB(LOA) CR-97-361-PHX-RCB 14 ORDER vs. 15 United States of America, 16 Respondent. 17 Currently pending before the court is the Report and 18 Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge Lawrence 19 O. Anderson ("R & R") (Doc. 18), "find[ing] that Movant 20 21 [Matias Velazquez] is entitled to error coram nobis relief[,]" R & R (Doc. 18) at 18:8-9, to which timely 22 23 objections have been filed by the Respondent, the United 24 States of America (Doc. 19). 25 Background I. Factual 26 27 On August 15, 1997, the movant pled guilty in this

federal district court to a one count information charging

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him with conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 286. Resp. (Doc. 10), exhs. 11 and 16 thereto. At sentencing, the court found that the "evidence reflect[ed] that only \$95,121 of the total loss of \$285,180 c[ould] be attributed to" the movant. <u>Id.</u>, exh. 13 thereto at 11, ¶ 2. Therefore, on June 14, 1999, after granting a downward departure, this court sentenced the movant to four years of probation. <u>Id.</u>, exh. 17 at 27:18-19.

The movant is a citizen of Mexico who has been a permanent resident of the United States since November 21, 1989. <u>Id.</u>, exh. 18 thereto. Prior to his guilty plea, on January 17, 1996, the movant completed a Form N-400, Application for Naturalization, with the assistance of a non-attorney representative from Chicanos Por La Causa. <u>Id.</u> The movant formally withdrew that Application, however, on April 17, 2002, after determining that his federal guilty plea rendered him "ineligible" to apply for naturalization. <u>Id.</u>, exh. 19 thereto.

On July 26, 2007, well after he had served his four year sentence of probation, the movant completed a second naturalization application, with the assistance from American Beginnings, a Yuma, Arizona organization. <u>Id.</u>, exh. 20 thereto. In his September 10, 2008, interview with respect to that application, the movant disclosed his felony conviction. <u>Id.</u>, exh. 21 thereto. Determining that conviction to be an "aggravated felony," the movant was found to be removable from the United States. <u>Id.</u> at 57-58.

Thereafter, on November 8, 2010, the Department of

Homeland Security issued a Notice of Appearance charging the movant with removability based upon his 1999 conviction.

Id., exh. 22 thereto. That Notice explained that because in the plea agreement the movant "stipulated that the total loss to the government attributable to [him] was \$95,121.00[,]" his conviction was an aggregated felony under section 101(a)(43(M) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Id. at 60 and 62. Hence, the movant was deportable on that basis. Id. at 62.

## II. Legal

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On March 31, 2010, in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010), the Supreme Court held "that the Sixth Amendment requires an attorney for a criminal defendant to provide advice about the risk of deportation arising from a guilty plea." Chaidez v. United States, \_\_\_ U.S. \_\_\_, 133 S.Ct. 1103, 1105 (Feb. 20, 2013). Exactly one year later, on March 31, 2011, the movant, heavily relying upon Padilla, filed a "Motion to Vacate Plea of Guilty & Set Aside Judgement/Motion for Expungement" (Doc. 1). The movant argued, inter alia, that he was entitled to such relief because his defense counsel did not properly advise him that "his deportation was presumptively or 'virtually' mandatory." Mot. (Doc. 1) at 5:15 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)). Relatedly, the movant further argued that his defense counsel's "failure to properly advise [him] of the immigration consequences" of his guilty plea "constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel under" Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984), Padilla, and

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<u>United States v. Kwan</u>, 407 F.3d 1005 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2005). <u>Id.</u> at 8:18-20.

In recommending that the movant be granted relief based upon the writ of error coram nobis, the Magistrate Judge, like the movant, heavily relied upon <a href="Padilla">Padilla</a>, and he also relied upon Kwan. In fact, in finding that the "performance" of movant's counsel was "deficient[,]" the Magistrate Judge reasoned that "[u]nder Padilla and Kwan, Movant should have been advised of the mandatory immigration consequences of his quilty plea." R & R (Doc. 18) at 16:28-17:1. More specifically, the Magistrate Judge found that "[d]efense counsel's performance was deficient for failing to research the relevant immigration law and failing to provide Movant accurate advice regarding the immigration consequences of his guilty plea - mandatory deportation." Id. at 17:5-7. Relying upon United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630 (3rd Cir. 2011), as well as lower courts within this Circuit, and because the parties did not dispute the retroactivity of Padilla, the Magistrate Judge applied Padilla retroactively. <u>See id.</u> at 12:21-28, n.3.

On February 20, 2013, however, the Supreme Court abrogated Orocio, and expressly held that Padilla "announced a 'new rule,'" and thus under the Court's retroactivity analysis, a person whose conviction was final before the 2010 Padilla decision cannot benefit from that new rule. See Chaidez, 133 S.Ct. at 1111. Because it appears that the movant's conviction herein was final before the Supreme Court's decision in Padilla, and because Padilla is the

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1	primary basis for the movant's request for relief in this
2	action, the court hereby ORDERS that:
3	(1) the movant, Matias Velazquez, shall have twenty
4	(20) days from the date of entry of this order in which to
5	file and serve a memorandum of law addressing the impact of
6	<u>Chaidez v. U.S.</u> ,, 133 S.Ct. 1103 (Feb. 20,
7	2013), if any, upon the pending R & R and the United States'
8	objections thereto:
9	(2) a response, <b>shall</b> be filed and served in
10	accordance with LRCiv 7.2 (c); and
11	(3) a reply, if any, <b>shall</b> be filed and served in
12	accordance with LRCiv 7.2(d).
13	DATED this 10th day of April, 2013.
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16	Robert C. Broomfield
17	Senior United States District Judge
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21	Copies to counsel of record
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